

***INTERNATIONAL SECURITY / MIDDLE EAST UPDATE***  
***July 21 - July 28, 2011***

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**1. [Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament](#) (07-27-2011)**

Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Verification and Compliance Rose Gottemoeller at a High Level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament, New York, NY

Mr. President, Good morning and thank you for the opportunity to speak today.

The United States welcomed the initiative of the Secretary-General to convene last September's High Level Meeting on "Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations," in the hopes that it would spur progress on FMCT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. We co-sponsored the related UNGA Resolution on "Follow-up to the high-level meeting" and we also welcome this opportunity today to take stock of where we are ten months later. The United States shares your commitment to progress and your interest in seeing this process carried forward.

Mr. President, two years ago in his speech in Prague, President Obama affirmed the commitment of the United States "to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" and laid out a plan of action for near term practical steps to move in that direction. Since then, significant progress has been registered. I won't detail all of it here, but I would like to highlight a few successes because they stand in stark contrast to the continuing failure to begin negotiations on a priority objective – a ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

A key arms control achievement of the past year is the entry-into-force of the New START Treaty with the Russian Federation this past February. Implementation of the Treaty is well underway. As of last weekend, we and the Russian Federation had exchanged 1,000 notifications in implementation of the treaty regime. Furthermore, we have conducted 13 inspections, six by the Russian Federation and seven by the United States. We are keeping pace in our implementation efforts.

In May, President Obama also submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, the protocols of the African and South Pacific nuclear-weapon free zones treaties. And we are in discussion with parties to the Southeast Asia and Central Asia nuclear- weapon- free- zones treaties in an effort to reach agreement that would allow the United States to sign the Protocols to those treaties, as well.

The United States remains committed to securing ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and we are engaging the United States Senate and the American public on the merits of that treaty.

And, as already reported by the distinguished representative of France, the NPT Nuclear Weapon States - the P5 - met in Paris 30 June-1 July to engage on issues bearing on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, and in particular steps outlined in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. This was a continuation of discussions begun in London in 2009 and will continue with a third conference in the context of the 2012 NPT Prepcom. These meetings are helping to build a process for P5 dialogue on transparency, nuclear doctrine, and on verification, recognizing that such a dialogue is needed if we are to establish a firm foundation for further disarmament efforts.

Mr. President, the United States has spared no effort to initiate negotiations in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons; completion of such a Treaty continues to be the top multilateral priority for the United States and the vast majority of others, and would be a major international achievement in nonproliferation and disarmament. At a time when significant progress has been registered in other areas of arms control and disarmament, it is all the more disappointing that a single state has prevented the CD from again taking its place on the disarmament stage and undertaking negotiations to reach that long overdue objective.

The preference of the United States is to negotiate the FMCT within the Conference on Disarmament. We welcomed the initiative of Australia and Japan to organize serious technical FMCT discussions on the margins of the Conference on Disarmament this year. The activity proved to be productive, substantive, and collegial. But this does not obscure the central fact that the CD remains blocked and we are no closer to FMCT negotiations today than we were two years ago when a compromise Program of Work was adopted by consensus by all 65 CD members.

It is because of this continuing stalemate that we have launched consultations to move this issue forward. We are encouraged, therefore, that the P5 agreed in Paris to take steps prior to the next UNGA to renew efforts with other relevant partners to promote such FMCT negotiations, and we are planning these activities now. Mr. President, turning to the issue of the UN disarmament machinery and how it functions - or does not function - I note that this is often a subject of discussion. For example, "improvements" motivated the 1978 decision to create the Committee on Disarmament - renamed Conference soon after - by the then Member States of the CD's predecessor body. They judged that certain changes, such as a rotating Presidency and membership expansion, would render the body more representative and more productive; the decisions of those States were recalled in the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament.

More recently, serious thought and a number of interesting ideas have emerged regarding reform of the Conference on Disarmament and other disarmament machinery. But we should consider such proposals with our eyes wide open, realistic about what the root cause of the current deadlock is. While the machinery could certainly benefit from a tune-up, it is not the underlying cause of the breakdown in the CD. The Conference on Disarmament has produced good results in years past – the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the CTBT. Put simply, when countries share an objective they can move it forward in the CD, and this is an experience we wish to see repeated, starting with the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

Mr. President, the UN Secretary- General has offered recommendations on how to proceed with a review of multilateral disarmament affairs and his Advisory Board has provided us a thoughtful report. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has also provided stimulating food for thought. We have a wealth of ideas. A panel of “eminent persons,” the CD itself, or some others, might usefully continue exploration, to include recommendations on the following:

- How to revamp or reconsider the role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission which, after yeoman’s efforts, has been unable to reach consensus for a number of years on any agenda item;
- How to update the Geneva CD. Its Decalogue and agenda could be updated to reflect the current international security environment. Members should also review some of its other procedures and recommend changes that would encourage greater continuity and focus.
- How to provide for continuity on an agreed CD work from year to year, such as automatic rollover of an agreed program of work;
- How to protect national security interests while preventing abuse of the consensus rule; and
- Whether expansion of the CD would improve CD efficiency, and how to reflect universal disarmament goals in deliberative and negotiating bodies, while maintaining their efficacy and assuring that states’ security concerns are respected and protected. This is the fundamental issue. In this regard, we view that theoretically working at 193 will inevitably pose complexities. I might note that the CD in its current composition, expanded since 1996 to 65 Member States, has yet to demonstrate its ability to function as a negotiating body.

In exploring new ways to proceed, we think that balance is needed. The status quo is unacceptable, but we should also guard against being overly ambitious, lest we lose our way. As we seek our way forward, we must keep our eye on the prize and, for most of the international community, that prize is a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as the next immediate multilateral nuclear disarmament step. Calls for yet another Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament are a distraction at best. An SSOD is not the only or the most practical vehicle for reform in light of its record of failure. Unless we have agreed objectives for such a session, we should better direct our efforts where progress can be made.

Thank you very much again, for this opportunity to speak.

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## **2. Interview on Nuclear Arms Control with Kommersant Newspaper (07-26-2011)**

U.S. Department of State, Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Washington, DC

Interview With Kirill S. Belyaninov of Kommersant Newspaper

QUESTION: Thank you Madam for taking the time in your busy schedule. Can you please give me an update of the New START Treaty?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: It's off to a very good start. And, in fact, I see that the spirit of Geneva, as we used to call it, has been continued in the implementation of the treaty. And the spirit of Geneva is what we consider it – that is, my Russian counterparts and I – consider it to be the very pragmatic, businesslike, and positive working relationship we established in Geneva, and it's definitely continuing in the implementation of the treaty. We are constantly in communication. We're over a thousand notifications being passed back and forth between Moscow and Washington since the treaty entered into force.

And I hope, Kirill, by the time this article runs on Monday that I can say a thousand has been achieved by that time. But we're almost there – I think it's 965 today. But the pace of communication has been very precise, very efficient, and furthermore, in terms of the inspections, we're pretty much keeping pace with each other, with inspections going on in both the Russian Federation and also here in the United States at various missile and bomber bases.

So all in all, I would say the implementation's going forward smoothly, and it's going forward in a very businesslike and positive way.

QUESTION: If I may, when you say implementations, can you specify a little bit what exactly the (inaudible)? A lot of people not --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Sure. Implementation of the treaty involves several activities. It – the most famous, of course, are probably the onsite inspections. Everybody knows about them. We have Russian inspectors coming here to look at our both deployed nuclear forces – intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers – and, of course, U.S. inspectors go to the Russian Federation, to your bases as well. So –the procedures are very equal between the two sides; they are totally reciprocal. Every right that U.S. inspectors have in Russia, Russian inspectors have here in the United States to look at nuclear weapon systems.

So those are the most famous measures, but it's not very well known that we pass back and forth notifications all the time about the status of those nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems. That's very important because it helps us to have a very good day-to-day idea about what's going on in the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal, and it helps Russia have a very good idea, day to day, what's going on here in the United States.

For example, the notifications are passed every time a bomber is getting ready to move out of its home country. For example, when the Russian Bear H bombers go on training missions out over the ocean, we would receive a notification. And when U.S. bombers are going out for operations in a theater, then the Russian side gets a notification. So it really helps to make sure that we have a good mutual confidence in what's going on, that we have a good mutual understanding of what's going

on, and that there are no surprises between our two countries where our nuclear systems are concerned. And that's very important for stability – mutual stability and security.

So those are the notifications. In addition, every six months we exchange a comprehensive database. So we have a full accounting every six months of exactly what weapons systems are located, whether they are out of their deployment or operational bases and gone to maintenance, or perhaps they're being retired. So it's very important to have regular updates. Every six months, we do get a comprehensive update. But I will also stress that those notifications I mentioned a moment ago are used in the interim period so that, day in, day out, we have a good sense of what's going on in each other's strategic nuclear arsenals.

I think of the database as a living document, really. The database is updated constantly, and then every six months we do a comprehensive update just to make sure that the notifications have been keeping up with the overall activity in each of our nuclear arsenals.

So those are the three, I would say, main activities in implementation. And, of course, all those are backed up then with our own national systems, so-called National Technical Means of Verification. The United States and Russia both have systems of overhead satellites that keep track of what's going on in each other's countries. And so that is considered our own national technical means. And that's one of the important rules in the New START Treaty that has its roots back in the 1970s, in the first strategic arms limitation treaties: that both sides do not take any steps to interfere with those national technical means, to interfere with those satellite assets.

QUESTION: Yeah. But if I can ask about the practical reasons for the United States to be involved in such a treaty. Because some experts in Russia and in the United States said that it has very little – structurally, it has very little practical reason simply because the situation with the Russian nuclear weapons is such that they're aging, and in the course of a couple years, including a number of Russian nuclear warheads will be way below the START Treaty limits for natural, (inaudible) phased out, because they're aging and they have to be removed. In your opinion, what's the practical reason for the United States to go with such a treaty?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Well, we don't see it that way. As a matter of fact, the United States and Russia still have over 90 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world. So we are still essential partners in the effort to first reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. So that's the first and most important issue.

And the second is, I think, very important for both sides to have that confidence in the future, confidence in the mutual stability between our two sides. And that is something that we can achieve by having agreed central limits. So we now have agreed central limits in the START Treaty of 1,550 deployed warheads, 700 nuclear delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers. That gives each side a certainty that the other cannot build up beyond those levels.

You mentioned that Russian systems are being retired. Yes, and U.S. systems are being retired, too. Both sides want to be sure in seven years time, when the treaty is fully implemented, that suddenly one side or the other couldn't bring some of those older weapons systems back to redeploy the warheads – sometimes we use the term to "upload" warheads onto delivery vehicles. And so I think that mutual confidence in agreed central limits is of huge value to both of our sides, because it helps us to make reasonable and reasoned decisions about the future – what exactly we need to do to sustain and, in the case of Russia, modernize forces. You understand that you're not going to have to build up, for example, against a huge increase in U.S. weapons because the New START treaty is constraining our capabilities.



QUESTION: Before signing the treaty last spring, I believe, the United States made some unprecedented steps when the Administration disclosed the previously secret data on the number of nuclear weapons the U.S. had. Do you expect Russia to follow this move? Are there any decisions on the openness, on the mutual openness of – from Russia's side?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: The U.S. has always taken the view that more transparency is a good thing. Of course, every country has sensitive, classified information that it can't reveal. But that decision that you just spoke about a moment ago was made pursuant not to the New START Treaty negotiations, but it was made pursuant to the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in May of 2010 and the United States felt that it was very important to convey to the entire community of countries involved in the NPT that – hello, are you still there?

QUESTION: Yeah, yeah. I am.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Involved in the NPT that we were going to be open and transparent about our weapons holdings, so that is why that information was published at that time. Of course, we hope all nuclear weapons states will be transparent also, and every country has to make their own decisions in that regard. But for your information, I was in Paris a few weeks ago for the P-5 Conference on Verification and Transparency. And one of the important things we agreed at that conference, and Jamie can get you the statement we released afterwards if you don't have it--but we agreed that we would be working together on reporting our nuclear arsenals to the public. And I don't know what we'll be able to achieve there, but it is an important activity under the NPT, the Nonproliferation Treaty, how much we're going to be reporting.

QUESTION: And Russian agreed to that –

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Yes.

QUESTION: -- or Vice versa?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: In fact, it was agreed in May of 2010 as part of the so-called action plan that came out of the NPT Review Conference in May of 2010. But we reiterated in Paris that we will all be willing to work together on that reporting aspect.

QUESTION: It seems to be – the START Treaty was ratified. Russia threatened to withdraw from the treaty many times, even recently President Medvedev who said that if the success we achieved in – talked about European missile defense – Russia can withdraw from the treaty. Do you consider this threat serious and how – to your opinion is it just like – how is it (inaudible) how abnormal it is, how unusual it is?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Well, you know that every big international arms control treaty has a withdrawal clause, and there is a withdrawal clause in the New START Treaty. When a country decides that a treaty is no longer in its national interest, is no longer serving its national interest then, of course, a country, any country, has a right to withdraw from a treaty that has a withdrawal clause of this kind. That's a very normal international legal practice and it is something that we insisted on as well, not just – it was not something that just Russia insisted on, but we insisted on as well.

Of course, as I just said a moment ago, the New START Treaty implementation is going very well. It's been very positive. It's a bright spot in the U.S.-Russian relationship, and we see it as

continuing to be an environment where we will be cooperating together very positively, and we see it as a place where we can really enhance our mutual understanding. So as far as we're concerned, we hope to continue on that very positive trajectory and we would see no reason to be thinking about withdrawal.

QUESTION: But if I can follow up on the missile defense because most Russian politicians are connecting these two subjects and during – before recent visit to Washington, Minister Lavrov also said that Russia can reconsider its territory if U.S. won't give written guarantees that missile defense is not aimed at Russia. And the Russian politicians are saying that the American side continues refusing to give such assurances.

If I can ask, is it – again, the political question for the U.S. Administration to give such guarantees to Russian side or –

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: We've been very clear all along, and this was in the course of the New START Treaty negotiations from day one. We were very clear that the New START Treaty is not about limiting missile defenses. Our presidents agreed in London in April of 2009 before the negotiations were launched that the New START Treaty was to be about limits in strategic offensive forces, and so that's the basis on which we worked in Geneva, and that's the basis on which this treaty was concluded.

We have also been very, very clear, and I have said it in testimony as the New START Treaty was being ratified, and it's also part of our national policy, part of our national law, that we do not build missile defense systems to undermine the strategic offensive capabilities of any country; that is simply not the case. We are building our missile defenses against limited missile threats. So that is the focus of this system in Europe. And when you look at the technical capabilities of it into the future, that's what the system is designed to do. It's designed to deal with limited missile defense threats.

We really do believe that the best way to move forward in this very difficult area - the best way to move forward is by developing some pragmatic cooperation because that's the best way to develop understanding about the technical capabilities of the system that we will be developing. I don't know if you know the expression in American English, "to kick the tires." It's much better to have a chance to walk right up to a technical system and "kick the tires": to see exactly how it operates and what it looks like and what its capabilities are. That's how you come to have some understanding and to be reassured. It's much better to understand what the capabilities are from a technical point of view.

QUESTION: Right. Well, what – a few more questions and I will (inaudible). Is the technical assistance, which the United States providing to Russian nuclear complexes is connected to the START Treaty anyhow? And can I ask you about the status of this – how the U.S. for 20 years by now was helping Russia to finance the systems of physical defense and (inaudible) defense and so and so forth. So what this stage this is now?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: This is – with regard to the so-called Cooperative Threat Reduction Program?

QUESTION: Right. Right.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: -- That program has been in place since the early 1990s and it's been very – I would say very effective in terms of ensuring the physical protection of

Russian facilities that are involved with fissile material, nuclear weapons, and nuclear delivery systems. It's been also a very good area of cooperation although, I must say, it's not in my area of responsibility right now. It's run out of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. I was responsible, when I worked in the Department of Energy in the late 1990s, for the program. As far as I know, they're still going very well, but a lot of work has been accomplished over the last 20 years, so they are not nearly as intensive as they were some 10 years ago when I was working in DOE.

QUESTION: Right. Well, I mean, my initial question as very – because of – and this program is quite expansive, and the economic difficulties can affect the future of this program more, and you have spoken (inaudible) with this.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Oh, that's a very interesting question, actually, because this is our budget season here in the United States and our Congress is debating the national budget coming up for future fiscal years, FY12 and 13. And as a matter of fact, I just read the news that, in fact, the House of Representatives has really supported these programs going forward, which is a good sign because, as you know, the House of Representatives is really the home of our so-called fiscal hawks. (Laughter.) And they have been very critical of many programs across the board, but it seems like they are being positive in supporting this set of cooperative threat reduction programs.

QUESTION: It seems to me that the nuclear weapons and nuclear technologies – are actually the less sensitive area in U.S.-Russian relations. For example, if you count the achievements of the current administration, foreign policy achievements, you immediately can name the START Treaty, the 123 Agreement, the plutonium disposition agreement and so on and so forth. What is your opinion – why is it easier to talk about the nuclear issues than about anything else? And why so?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: It's because we have a long and rich history in working together on these issues. I began working these issues in the 1970s when the first strategic arms limitation treaties were being negotiated, the so-called SALT treaties. We have been steadily working on cooperation in this area now for 40 years, and it shows. We have a very good community of experts that are well acquainted with each other. They have very positive working relationships, a very pragmatic attitude. And furthermore, they are professional experts who understand the details, the technical aspects, and speak the same language. So essentially, it makes for the cooperation in these areas to be much more efficient and effective.

However, Kirill, I wouldn't say that it always goes easily. That plutonium disposition agreement that was finally brought into force last week when Minister Lavrov was here in Washington with Secretary Clinton, that has been in the works since I was working in DOE in the 1990s. So it does take a long time to bring these things to fruition, but I do see this area of nuclear cooperation as one where we can have steady progress, even though sometimes it takes a long time, but steady progress because we have this very rich history of working together.

QUESTION: And just to follow up on, also 123 Agreement, if it's possible?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Sure.

QUESTION: Some people in Russian agency (inaudible) openly said that if you want to (inaudible) treaty as the (inaudible) possibility for Russia to occupy the new business (inaudible), to bring to Russia and store the American-made spent fuel precisely from the power plants in Taiwan and Southeast Asia. And then do you see this possibility? Do you really think it's realistic?



ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: It's difficult for me to know because there are some particular legal matters that will have to be worked out in the Russian Federation, the structure of your laws being such there will have to be some decisions made by the government; it will be entirely up to the executive branch and the Duma, the legislative branch, to work through those issues and make those decisions. So it's very difficult for me to say, but I do know that it's been an area of very active discussion among some Russian experts.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much, Kirill. Do you have a final question?

QUESTION: Oh. I'm sorry, but, well, just once more, would this such development be of any interest of American side?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Well, since I don't work in the nuclear industry, I can't say. (Laughter.) But I do think that the 123 Agreement is a great accomplishment because it opens doors to all kinds of cooperation between the United States and Russia on nuclear energy issues. And it's also an area that I was working on, again, for many, many years, since the time I was in the Department of Energy in the 1990s. So when it was finally achieved last year, I was very, very glad about it. It's quite an accomplishment.

QUESTION: Well, more people are writing about it in Russian media. They very often quote your op-ed pieces (inaudible).

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Oh, really?

QUESTION: Yes, going back to, like, the (inaudible).

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: It's good to know that some of the things I write have a history. I mean, they come back again.

QUESTION: Yes. Well, the (inaudible).

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: I guess. Okay. Well, listen, thank you very much. If there is anything you need clarified or if you want that P-5 statement from Paris, please let Jamie know and we'll be happy to help you.

QUESTION: (In Russian)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Okay. Well, thank you very much. Nice to talk to you.

QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you very much for your time.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Okay. Bye-bye.

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### **3. Open Security Council Debate on the Situation in the Middle East (07-26-2011)**

Remarks by Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at an Open Security Council Debate on the Situation in the Middle East, New York, NY

Thank you, Mr. President. It's an honor to have you, Minister Hoyer, preside over the Council. And thank you Special Coordinator Serry for your briefing today.

Mr. President, the United States is committed to a just and fair resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Last May President Obama outlined a comprehensive vision for peace between Israelis and Palestinians. He noted that "At a time when the people of the Middle East and North Africa are casting off the burdens of the past, the drive for a lasting peace that ends the conflict and resolves all claims is more urgent than ever." The President's remarks laid out a firm foundation for future negotiations, and these remarks have been strongly supported by the international community.

My government has been clear all along. The only place where permanent status issues can be resolved, including borders and territory, is in negotiations between the parties—not in international fora such as the United Nations.

Mr. President, we must all ensure that our actions help move peace efforts forward. So our focus has been on encouraging direct engagement by the parties on the basis of President Obama's remarks.

We are also continuing our support for the Palestinian Authority's important efforts to strengthen the Palestinian economy, enhance the capability and professionalism of its security forces, and build up the necessary institutions of statehood.

But, as President Obama has made clear, Palestinian leaders will not achieve peace or prosperity for their people if Hamas insists on a path of terror and rejection. Palestinian leaders must also take further steps to combat incitement to violence. And Hamas must immediately and unconditionally release Gilad Shalit, who has now suffered in captivity for more than five years.

Mr. President, today is our last open debate on the Middle East before the opening of the next UN General Assembly. Let there be no doubt: symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the United Nations in September will not create an independent Palestinian state. The United States will not support unilateral campaigns at the United Nations in September or any other time.

A viable and sustainable peace agreement can only be achieved by mutual agreement of the parties themselves. Only through serious and responsible negotiations can the parties achieve the shared goal of two states for two peoples, with a secure, Jewish state of Israel living side by side in peace and security with an independent, contiguous, and viable state of Palestine.

This is the goal. This is the vision. But there are no short-cuts. We call again on all member states to encourage the parties to take the constructive actions to promote peace—and to avoid actions that could undermine trust, prejudge negotiations, or place the temptations of symbolism over the hard work of reaching agreement.

Let me also reiterate that, like every U.S. administration for decades, we do not accept legitimacy of continued Israeli settlement activity. The fate of existing settlements must be dealt with by the parties, along with other permanent-status issues. And Israel should continue its efforts to deter and prosecute anti-Palestinian violence perpetrated by extremists.

Mr. President, let me turn briefly to the situation in Gaza.

The recent seizures of advanced weaponry bound for Gaza, as well as the recent and alarming rocket and mortar attacks on Israel from Gaza, should remind us all that Israel continues to have clear and legitimate security interests regarding cargo bound for Gaza.

While Israel has eased restrictions on the movement of goods and people in and out of Gaza, more needs to be done. Ordinary Gazans still have very real humanitarian needs. So we are working closely with Israel, the international donor community, and the Palestinian Authority to deliver critical assistance to the people of Gaza. We continue to urge those who wish to deliver assistance to use established channels to ensure that Israel's legitimate security needs are addressed while the Palestinians' humanitarian needs are met.

Mr. President, let me say a few words about the ongoing crisis in Syria. The world has been inspired by the courage of the peaceful protestors who have taken to the streets across the country to demand their universal rights. The regime has responded with violence, brutality, and mass arrests.

But Syria is clearly headed toward a new political order, shaped by the Syrian people, in which the government will derive its legitimacy from the consent of the governed. A transition to democracy is already underway. President Asad may try to delay this transition, but he cannot stop it, and Syria can never return to the way it was before.

The United States fully supports the Syrian people's demands for a unified Syria with a democratic, representative, and inclusive government that respects basic liberties and provides equal protection under the law for all citizens, regardless of sect, ethnicity or gender. We call on the Syrian government to immediately stop the violence and the arrests and to allow for peaceful protests and freedom of speech. Human rights abuses must end now, and human rights monitors must immediately be granted access to all of Syria. We again call on the Syrian government to permit access to the Fact Finding Mission called for by the UN Human Rights Council in April.

Mr. President the Security Council has a responsibility, to address the situation in Syria and the government's ongoing repression, which could further destabilize Syria and undermine peace and security in the region.

Finally, Mr. President, let me say a word about Lebanon. We hope that Lebanon's new government will live up to all of its international obligations, including the full implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1680, and 1701, as well as uphold Lebanon's commitment to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

In particular, we call on the Government of Lebanon to continue to meet its obligations under international law to support the Tribunal. Lebanon's independent judicial proceedings offer the nation a chance to move beyond its long history of political violence and achieve the peace and stability that the Lebanese people deserve. Those who oppose the Special Tribunal seek to create a false choice between justice and stability. Lebanon, like every other country, deserves both.

Thank you, Mr. President.

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#### **4. Deputy Assistant Secretary Rose in Israel on Missile Defense (07-25-2011)**

Remarks by Frank A. Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, 2nd Annual Israel Multinational Missile Defense Conference, Tel Aviv, Israel

### **U.S. Missile Defense and Regional Security**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

Thank you for inviting me to participate in this conference for the second year in a row; it is a pleasure to be here. This conference is important because it gives those of us who are involved in the 'nuts and bolts' of formulating and implementing Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) policy a chance to communicate with a wider community on the status of our efforts and to get your feedback.

Today, I'd like to focus on three areas. First, I'd like to reflect on the United States' approach to missile defense, and the threats we and our friends and allies face. Second, I'll share how the United States has been meeting the commitments we laid out in our new missile defense strategy, especially with respect to our efforts in Europe. And third, I'll discuss the Obama Administration's continued commitment to missile defense cooperation with Israel.

#### **THE U.S. APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE**

Missile defense plays an important role in the broader U.S. international security strategy, supporting both defense and diplomacy. Missile defense assures our allies and partners that the United States has the will and the means to deter and, if necessary, defeat a potential ballistic missile attack against friends, partners, the U.S. homeland, and our forward deployed troops and assets. Missile defense also may help constrain regional actors from trying to inhibit or disrupt the U.S. ability to come to the defense or assistance of its friends or other states.

When I spoke at this conference last year, I discussed how the growth in the regional ballistic missile threat was one of the driving forces of the new U.S. approach to missile defense. The predominant ballistic missile threat to deployed U.S. forces and our allies and partners around the world continues to come from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Compounding this threat, many states are working to make their missile systems not only more reliable and more accurate but better protected from pre-launch attack and able to counter missile defense systems. A good example of this is Iran's recent public display of silos for its ballistic missile force. Some states are also working to develop missiles suitable for delivering nuclear, chemical, and/or biological payloads.

Iran and North Korea continue to pursue technologies that could support long-range missile development, such as space launch vehicles. While we are uncertain about when a missile threat to the U.S. homeland will emerge, there is no doubt that these states currently seek to target U.S. forces deployed in their regions, as well as our allies and partners. The United States has consequently rebalanced its missile defense program with the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review to focus greater attention on countering the current threat to U.S. forces, allies, and partners while maintaining our ability to defend the U.S. homeland.

President Obama has made international cooperation on missile defense a key Administration priority. The United States seeks to prevent the development, acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries. By reducing our adversaries' confidence in the

effectiveness of such attacks, we enhance deterrence. Recognizing that each region has unique deterrence and defense requirements due to differences in geography, history, and relationships, the United States is pursuing a region-by-region approach based on the following three principles:

- First, the United States will deter adversaries through strong regional deterrence architectures built upon strong cooperative relationships and appropriate burden sharing with our allies and partners.
- Second, the United States will pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) within key regions that is tailored to the threats unique to that region, including the scale, scope, and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment. This approach means we will phase in and implement the best available technology to meet existing and evolving threats, and adapt to situations that evolve in an unforeseen manner.
- Third, in order to meet a global demand for missile defense assets that will continue to exceed supply, the United States will develop mobile capabilities that can be relocated to adapt to a changing threat, or provide surge defense capabilities where they are most needed.

## COOPERATION IN EUROPE

In September 2009, President Obama unveiled a new plan for providing missile defense in Europe. Compared to the previous plan, President Obama's plan would provide more effective missile defense protection sooner to our NATO allies threatened by ballistic missiles from the Middle East. The President's plan will augment the defense of the United States. The President outlined a four-phase implementation plan, during which the United States would deploy increasingly capable missile defense assets to defend Europe against the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the pursuit of nuclear weapons capability. I'd like to give you a brief rundown of the significant progress we have made in implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).

In Europe, the Obama Administration is committed to implementing the PAA within a NATO context, as part of NATO's decision to develop a territorial missile defense capability, and, more broadly, as part of our commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and European security. NATO's decision to adopt a new mission of territorial missile defense at the Lisbon Summit created a framework for NATO Allies to contribute and optimize missile defense assets for NATO's collective defense. The EPAA will be a U.S. national contribution to the NATO capability.

At the Lisbon Summit last November, NATO Heads of State and Government decided to develop a missile defense capability to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces. They also agreed to expand the scope of the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program's command, control, and communications capabilities beyond the protection of NATO deployed forces to also protect NATO European populations, territory, and forces. NATO's new Strategic Concept clearly states that to ensure NATO has the full range of capabilities to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, NATO will develop the capability to defend itself against ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East.

NATO's new approach to missile defense creates more opportunities for cooperation among our NATO Allies through a formalized NATO Command and Control system, as NATO will be able to input voluntary national contributions from the United States and our NATO Allies into the overall NATO capability. We continue to make progress in developing the command and control



procedures, which will govern the conduct of NATO missile defense. When NATO is ready, the President will transfer operational control of the EPAA to the Alliance as the first national contribution to the NATO territorial missile defense capability.

As you are well aware, the EPAA will be deployed in phases. The United States is developing a flexible and adaptive system capable of responding to evolving and emerging threats and the development of BMD technology.

As President Obama stated, the United States is committed to deploying all four phases of the EPAA, which will place upper tier SM-3 interceptors on land in Europe as well as on Aegis BMD-capable ships deployed to the region. Beyond U.S. assets, our European Allies also have systems that could contribute to the defense of Europe against ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East. Some of our Allies, for example, already have Aegis ships which are useful even before the Aegis BMD capability has been installed. There are also land- and sea-based sensors that could be linked into the system, as well as lower tier systems, such as PATRIOT from other NATO countries, that can be integrated and used to provide point defenses.

Beyond these critical elements of the EPAA, let me now discuss the excellent progress that has been made in implementing the new approach.

In March of this year, the EPAA Phase 1 became operational with the deployment of the USS Monterey to the Mediterranean. The Monterey is an Aegis BMD-capable multi-role ship. We are also discussing the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar somewhere in Southern Europe, but no final decisions have yet been made.

For Phase 2 of the EPAA, we concluded negotiations with Romania to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 missile defense interceptor site on May 4, 2011, and expect to sign the agreement later this year. The United States and Romania jointly selected the Deveselu Air Base near Caracal, Romania. The deployment to Romania is anticipated to occur in the 2015 timeframe.

With respect to Phase 3, in July 2010, we reached final agreement with Poland to place a similar U.S. missile defense interceptor site there in the 2018 timeframe. Poland is in the final stages of the ratification process for those documents.

Finally with respect to Phase 4, the Department of Defense has begun concept development of a more advanced interceptor for deployment in the 2020 timeframe.

Before I close on U.S. missile defense in Europe, let me touch on the subject of missile defense and Russia. Missile defense cooperation with Russia is a Presidential priority, as it was for several previous U.S. Administrations. Successful missile defense cooperation would provide concrete benefits to Russia, our NATO allies, and the United States. We believe it will strengthen, not weaken – strategic stability over the long term and will further help strengthen our relationship with Russia, while assisting in the defense of Europe.

We hope to build a durable framework for missile defense cooperation with Russia. We have also repeatedly worked at the highest levels of the United States Government to be transparent with Russia, and to explain that the EPAA does not threaten Russia's strategic deterrent or its security. Our missile defenses are being deployed against limited attacks and are neither designed to, nor do they have the capability to target the large numbers and sophistication of Russian strategic forces.

We have a real opportunity at this time to begin concrete BMD cooperation with Russia both bilaterally and within the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Such cooperation could greatly improve regional and trans-regional security. In the NATO-Russia context, we concluded a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges last year, and the United States and Russia recently finished a bilateral Joint Threat Assessment dealing with regional ballistic missile threats. We also are looking to renew our bilateral and NRC theater missile defense cooperation with Russia and will, in the words of the November 2010 Lisbon NRC Joint Statement, “develop a comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future framework for missile defense cooperation.” We are also seeking cooperation with Russia on a Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement that would provide a framework for a host of defense-related research and development activities.

Even as we seek greater cooperation with Russia on missile defense, I want to reiterate what President Obama has clearly stated—the United States cannot accept limitations or restrictions on the development or deployment of U.S. missile defenses. The United States has made it clear that no nation or group of nations will have veto power over U.S. missile defense efforts because missile defense is a critical capability needed to counter a growing 21st century threat to the United States, our allies and partners, and our deployed forces. Likewise, under the terms of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO alone will bear responsibility for defending the Alliance from the ballistic missile threat. It is in the common interests of the United States, NATO, and Russia to jointly cooperate in the field of missile defense, and through such cooperation clearly communicate and demonstrate to potentially hostile states that the development and acquisition of ballistic missiles will not provide an advantage.

#### BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL

Turning now to U.S. missile defense cooperation with Israel, a subject of immediate interest to this audience, let me begin by saying that our missile defense cooperation with Israel is separate from our efforts in Europe but robust, enduring, and unshakable. Israel was one of the first U.S. partners in missile defense, and the Obama Administration is committed to missile defense cooperation with Israel.

Let me begin by discussing the threat, starting with Iran.

Iran has claimed, during its war games last month and previously this year, to have successfully tested solid-fuel, 2,000 km medium range ballistic missiles, demonstrating a capability to strike targets in Israel and Southeastern Europe. Iran is fielding increased numbers of mobile regional ballistic missiles, claims to have incorporated anti-missile-defense tactics and capabilities into its ballistic missile forces, and has recently unveiled missile silo facilities. It is likely working to improve the accuracy of its short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and claims to have the ability to produce intercontinental ballistic missiles. Its recent space launches demonstrate that it has the applicable technologies. On June 15, Iran used its Safir space launch vehicle to lift the 34-pound Rasad-1 satellite into orbit, the second satellite it's put into orbit in two years. In 2010, Iran showed the intent to develop even more powerful rockets, when it unveiled plans for a four-engine, liquid-fuel Simorgh rocket to carry a 220-pound satellite into orbit at an altitude of 310 miles. Both the Safir and Simorgh programs allow Iran to gain experience with technologies that have direct applications in longer-range ballistic missile systems.

Syria possesses one of the largest ballistic missile development programs in the region. Its arsenal already includes hundreds of mobile SCUD-class and short-range ballistic missiles and it continues to seek more advanced equipment and materials from North Korea, Iran, and other illicit suppliers. As you well know, these weapons are capable of reaching much of Israel and other states in the

region. Such capabilities highlight the importance of our missile defense cooperation and the role missile defense can play in maintaining regional stability.

Hizballah and Hamas (particularly the former) are capable of conducting irregular warfare campaigns that include, in the case of Hizballah, launching thousands of short-range rockets into Israeli population centers. Hizballah is attempting to expand its reach and effects by acquiring rockets with greater range and accuracy.

Because we understand the serious nature of the threat, we are working with Israel on a number of missile defense activities to address these threats, from plans and operations to specific programs:

- **BMD Operations and Plans:** Since 2001, Israel and the United States have conducted a joint biennial exercise, called Juniper Cobra, to work on integrating interceptors, radars, and other systems. In addition, the United States and Israel continue to meet regularly and coordinate extensively on a wide range of missile defense issues.
- **Arrow Weapons System:** The Arrow Weapons System provides Israel with an indigenous capability to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Earlier this year, Israel and the United States successfully detected, tracked, and intercepted a ballistic target missile using the Arrow Weapon System. This system continues to be jointly developed, with the United States and Israel co-manufacturing the Arrow-2 system and working closely together on the more powerful Arrow-3. The Arrow-3 will enable Israel to engage threat missiles at even greater ranges and at higher-altitudes, a capability that is particularly effective against potentially WMD- armed ballistic missiles.
- **X-band Radar:** In September 2008, the United States and Israel worked together closely to deploy an AN/TPY-2 radar to Israel. This powerful radar is linked to U.S. early warning satellites, and intended to enhance Israel's defense and missile detection capabilities.
- **David's Sling:** The United States and Israel are co-developing the "David's Sling" Weapon System (DSWS) to defend against short-range rocket and missile threats falling below the optimal capability for Israel's Arrow interceptor.
- **Iron Dome:** Earlier this year, the U.S. Congress authorized over \$200 million in support for Israel's Iron Dome interceptor system. These funds will be used by Israel to purchase more of these defensive systems, which showed their effectiveness in April when they successfully shot down eight rockets fired from Gaza. The system is designed to counter short-range missiles and rockets, and has already been successfully deployed this year.

The growing proliferation of missile threats reinforces the importance of the collaborative missile defense efforts I just outlined. Together we can work to protect what our adversaries would put at risk, both now and in the future. Our mutual commitment to cooperation on missile defense research and development, on deploying proven technologies and weapon systems such as the Arrow, and on gaining operational experience through joint exercises and training, will go far in enhancing Israeli security and our mutual interests, and in further cementing and expanding our partnership.

I want to close by noting the obvious which is that the worst-case scenario for dealing with missile threats is after a missile has launched. We are taking several steps diplomatically to counter missile proliferation and address missile programs of concern. We are working with the other 33 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Partners to create the global standard for controlling the

transfer of equipment, software, and technology that could make a contribution to rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles. We also are working to support the efforts of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), and are working through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to help partners improve their ability to stop shipments of proliferation concern. Those are just some of the efforts that are ongoing to address missile threats, and while we do this work quietly, these efforts are having an impact.

Thank you for your time and attention.

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## **5. U.S. Launches New Strategy to Combat Transnational Crime (07-25-2011)**

By MacKenzie C. Babb  
Staff Writer

Washington — The Obama administration's new Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime aims to diminish the "size, scope and influence of transnational organized crime and its impact on U.S. and international security and governance," says John Brennan, the president's assistant for counterterrorism and homeland security.

"The president's strategy will build and integrate the tools of American power to combat transnational organized crime, while also recognizing that we cannot do it alone. The United States must continue to play a strong leadership role, together with committed partners, in mobilizing international resources to address emerging threats," Under Secretary of State William Burns explained at the strategy's launch July 25. He and Brennan were joined at the announcement in Washington by Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and Attorney General Eric Holder, as well as representatives from the Treasury Department, the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Brennan said transnational crime threatens the world economy because criminals damage and distort financial systems by entering markets and undermining legitimate competition and market integrity. Criminals are also stealing U.S. intellectual property, racking up \$188 million in violations in 2010, according to the White House. Not only is this bad for business, Brennan said, but in cases of counterfeit pharmaceuticals, it can be deadly.

Drug trafficking organizations feed off the global demand for illicit drugs, "which fuels the power, impunity and violence of criminal organizations internationally," Brennan said. Human smuggling and trafficking networks "are a worldwide scourge growing ever more violent and lucrative, exploiting the most vulnerable among us."

Brennan said terrorists and insurgents are also increasingly turning to criminal networks for funding and logistics, including kidnap for ransom. According to a July 25 White House fact sheet on the strategy, 29 of the 63 top drug trafficking organizations identified by the Department of Justice in 2010 had links to terrorist organizations.

The new strategy will combat each of these problems through a series of strategic objectives, the White House said. These include protecting Americans and U.S. partners from the violence of criminal networks, helping partner countries strengthen governance to break the power of criminal networks, and breaking the economic power of transnational criminal networks by protecting strategic markets and the U.S. financial system from criminal penetration and abuse. It also seeks to defeat networks by targeting their infrastructures and preventing the criminal facilitation of terrorist

activities, and to build international consensus, multilateral cooperation and public-private partnerships.

It will meet these objectives through innovative capabilities and tools, including an executive order, a new presidential proclamation and a series of legislative proposals, the White House said.

Burns called organized crime in any form “a threat to decent, hardworking people across the world” that undermines legitimate economic activity, the rule of law and the integrity of vital government institutions meant to protect peace and security. It also undercuts the fight against poverty and slows sustainable development, he said.

Calling transnational organized crime a global problem, Burns said the State Department “remains determined, working closely with all of our interagency partners, to translate common interests into common action that makes all of us safer.”

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## **6. Fact Sheet: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (06-25-2011)**

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary

*“This Strategy is organized around a single, unifying principle: to build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat transnational organized crime and related threats to our national security — and to urge our partners to do the same... While this Strategy is intended to assist the United States Government in combating transnational crime, it also serves as an invitation for enhanced international cooperation. We encourage our partners and allies to echo the commitment we have made here and join in building a new framework for international cooperation to protect all our citizens from the violence, harm, and exploitation wrought by transnational organized crime.”*

-- President Barack Obama

### **Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime**

In the U.S. National Security Strategy, the President committed his Administration to the pursuit of four enduring national interests: security, prosperity, respect for universal values, and the shaping of an international order that can meet the challenges of the 21st century. The expanding size, scope, and influence of transnational organized crime (TOC) and its impact on U.S. and international security and governance represent one of the most significant of those challenges.

### **Transnational Organized Crime Threatens U.S. and International Security**

In January 2010, the United States completed a comprehensive assessment of transnational organized crime – the first such assessment since 1995. The assessment concluded that TOC networks are proliferating, striking new and powerful alliances, and engaging in a range of illicit activities as never before. The result is a convergence of threats that have evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing.

- TOC penetration of states is deepening, leading to co-option in some states and weakening of governance in many others. TOC networks insinuate themselves into the political process through bribery and in some cases have become alternate providers of governance, security, and livelihoods to win popular support. The nexus in some states among TOC groups and



elements of government – including intelligence services personnel – and big business figures threatens the rule of law.

- TOC threatens U.S. economic interests and can cause significant damage to world financial system by subverting legitimate markets. The World Bank estimates that about \$1 trillion is spent each year to bribe public officials. TOC groups, through their state relationships, could gain influence over strategic markets.
- Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are turning to crime and criminal networks for funding and logistics. In FY 2010, 29 of the 63 top drug trafficking organizations identified by the Department of Justice had links to terrorist organizations. While many terrorist links to TOC are opportunistic, this nexus is dangerous, especially if it leads a TOC network to facilitate the transfer of weapons of mass destruction material to terrorists.
- Some well-established organized criminal groups that have not previously been involved in producing narcotics are now seeking to develop their own distribution and trafficking networks.
- Human smuggling and trafficking-in-person networks are growing more violent and lucrative, and exploiting the most vulnerable, especially women and children.
- TOC networks are stealing U.S. intellectual property. Between FY 2003 and FY 2010, the yearly domestic value of customs seizures at U.S. port and mail facilities related to intellectual property right violations leaped from \$94 million to \$188 million
- TOC networks are increasingly involved in cybercrime, which costs consumers billions of dollars annually, threatens corporate and government computer networks, and undermines worldwide confidence in the global financial system.
- Often connecting these transnational threats are “facilitators,” who operate in both the licit and illicit worlds and provide services to criminals and terrorists.

### **Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime**

- The Strategy has five strategic objectives:
  1. Protect Americans and our partners from the harm, violence, and exploitation of transnational criminal networks.
  2. Help partner countries strengthen governance and transparency, break the corruptive power of transnational criminal networks, and sever state-crime alliances.
  3. Break the economic power of transnational criminal networks and protect strategic markets and the U.S. financial system from TOC penetration and abuse.
  4. Defeat transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest threat to national security by targeting their infrastructures, depriving them of their enabling means, and preventing the criminal facilitation of terrorist activities.
  5. Build international consensus, multilateral cooperation, and public-private partnerships to defeat transnational organized crime.

- There are 56 priority actions in the Strategy under the following chapters:

1. Start at Home: Taking Shared Responsibility for Transnational Organized Crime;
2. Enhance Intelligence and Information Sharing;
3. Protect the Financial System and Strategic Markets against Transnational Organized Crime;
4. Strengthen Interdiction, Investigations, and Prosecutions;
5. Disrupt Drug Trafficking and its Facilitation of Other Transnational Threats; and
6. Build International Capacity, Cooperation, and Partnerships.

- By prioritizing existing resources, the Strategy also introduces the following new and innovative capabilities and tools:

1. A new Executive Order will establish a sanctions program to block the property of significant transnational criminal organizations that threaten the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.
2. A series of legislative proposals to enhance the authorities available to investigate, interdict, and prosecute the activities of top transnational criminal networks. Collectively, the Administration's proposals reinvigorate the statutory landscape to be more responsive to extraterritorial threats and the increasingly global reach of criminal syndicates.
3. A new Presidential Proclamation under the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act will bar admission to the United States of persons designated under the Executive Order and other comparable sanctions programs. The Proclamation also provides additional legal authority for barring admission to the United States of persons subject to United Nations Security Council travel bans.
4. A new rewards program will supplement the success of existing narcotics rewards programs in obtaining information that leads to the arrest and conviction of the leaders of transnational criminal organizations that pose the greatest threats to national security.

- The Interagency Policy Committee on Illicit Drugs and Transnational Criminal Threats, led by the National Security Staff and the Office of National Drug Control Policy, will oversee implementation of the Strategy.

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## **7. Obama: Norway Attacks Show Need for Global Security Cooperation (07-22-2011)**

By Stephen Kaufman  
Staff Writer

Washington — President Obama expressed condolences to the Norwegian people after terror attacks targeted their government's headquarters in Oslo and a youth camp outside the city, and he

July 28, 2011

urged the international community to work together on security cooperation to help prevent terrorism.

In remarks with New Zealand Prime Minister John Key at the White House July 22, Obama said the United States will “provide any support that we can” to Norwegian authorities as they investigate the attacks.

Earlier in the day, a bomb detonated outside of Oslo’s main government buildings, reportedly killing seven people and seriously wounding two. The incident was followed by a shooting attack on young people attending a camp in Utoeya, an island outside of Oslo, which reportedly killed at least nine people. Norwegian police have reportedly said the shooter who was arrested has ties to the bombing in Oslo.

The president offered his personal condolences to the Norwegian people and said the attacks are “a reminder that the entire international community has a stake in preventing this kind of terror from occurring.”

It also demonstrates that “we have to work cooperatively together both on intelligence and in terms of prevention of these kinds of horrible attacks,” he said.

Prime Minister Key said that if the attacks are found to have been an act of global terrorism, then “what it shows is no country, large or small, is immune from that risk.”

“That’s why New Zealand plays its part in Afghanistan as we try and join others like the United States in making the world a safer place,” he said.

[Sympathy and Solidarity for Norway](#) (07-23-2011)

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